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Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a global shock with dramatic consequences on debts of 
governments called to alleviate the economic and social impact of the crisis on firms and 
households. We explore conditions for the feasibility of (COVID-19 generated) government 
debt relief, justified in principle by the exogenous characteristics of the shock. We outline 
several technically and economically feasible ways (involving debt “freezing”, debt 
rescheduling or outright debt cancellation) for achieving this goal and discuss their 
consequences on moral hazard and the Central Bank balance sheets, as well as their potential 
impact on CB’s independence, reputation and, ultimately, on inflation and exchange rates. We 
also discuss the distributive concerns which arise when a CB (as in the Eurozone) operates in 
a Union with several sovereign member states. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is an ongoing global shock that caused (as of 9 December 2020) 
67,53 million cases and more than 1,55 million deaths worldwide. The slowdown of economic 
activities induced by the restrictions aimed to reduce the contagion spread had dramatic effects 
on employment, economic growth, and global financial conditions. In order to alleviate its 
consequences on households and on the productive sector, Central Banks (CBs) and 
governments implemented a wide range of measures. The effects of these on deficits and on 
the stocks of debt have been huge. According to preliminary estimates, the pandemic has 
caused an increase of around 15 percentage points of the debt/GDP ratio at EU level (Micossi, 
2020). The Institute of International Finance estimates that the aggregate public and private 
debt has grown during the pandemic from 320% to 365% of global GDP in the first nine months 
of 2020, around 63% of this new debt having been purchased on the market by CBs. 
The extraordinary events we are experiencing and the exogenous nature of the shock 
affecting government debt justify on ethical grounds that this debt (and specifically that in the 
hands of CBs) should be frozen, rescheduled or even cancelled. In this paper we examine 
whether COVID-19 debt relief is technically and economically feasible and/or politically 
viable. 
The debt relief literature shows that episodes of debt restructuring eventually leading 
to debt cancellation are not so infrequent. Reinhardt and Trebesch (2016) analyse 48 episodes 
which occurred over two different periods in the 20th century and which involved two separate 
groups of countries: i) high income countries during the interwar period, and ii) developing 
countries in the post-Second World War period. By using difference-in-differences approaches 
and controlling for endogeneity, Reinhard and Trebesch show that debt relief generated 
positive effects on economic activity, debt service, and even the financial ratings of the 
countries involved, the effects being stronger and more significant in cases of debt cancellation 
vis à vis softer forms of debt relief. In a similar work Forni et al. (2016) show that debt 
restructurings with external private creditors during the period 1970-2010 have been associated 
with enhanced growth. 
From a theoretical point of view, some of the effects of forgiving sovereign debt have 
been widely discussed in the literature. Krugman (1988) argued that debt forgiveness can be 
preferable to debt financing because a large public debt distorts economic incentives in the 
debtor country, whilst the benefits from a positive economic performance are mostly 
appropriated by the creditors. Krugman argues that debt cancellation should be made 
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contingent on states of nature that the country cannot affect: the current pandemic squarely 
falls into this category. Hatchondo et al. (2014) further demonstrate that, under some 
conditions, debt reduction could improve country risk rating and could be ex post Pareto 
efficient. 
Empirically, Broner et al. (2014) find that the increases in public debt in the aftermath 
of the 2007 financial crisis led to a reallocation of credit away from the private sector and 
towards the public sector, with consequent reduction in private investment and negative effects 
on growth. Lo and Rogoff (2015) confirm that public and external debt overhang was an 
important reason for the sluggish economic growth experienced after the financial crisis. 
The above mentioned theoretical and empirical studies show that debt overhang has 
been a common characteristic of many periods of economic history for several countries. The 
present experience is however different. In all of the debt relief episodes of the last century 
analysed by Reinhardt and Trebesch (2016) and the rest of the literature, the creditor was a 
sovereign country; by contrast, in our case the government debt whose relief we are dealing 
with is held by Central banks.  
Proposals of central bank intervention in sovereign debt restructuring have been put 
forward in the recent past. Pâris and Wyplosz (2014) set out the PADRE (Politically Acceptable 
Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone) plan, where government debt of EU members in excess 
of the 60% debt/GDP threshold is purchased and converted into non-redeemable zero-interest 
perpetual debt. The authors are aware that the operation would create a negative net asset 
position in the ECB balance sheet, but argue that this position would be progressively covered 
by seignorage revenues accruing to each member country. In order to make the proposal 
“politically acceptable”, each country would pay its excess debt converted into ECB 
irredeemable perpetual bonds with its seignorage revenues, thereby avoiding redistributive 
effects across EU members. 
In this paper we argue that there are at least seven ways in which relief of the government 
debt created by EU member states and held by the ECB during the COVID-19 pandemic is 
economically feasible. 
(1) The first strategy consists of transforming from voluntary and reversible to irreversible 
the present choice by the ECB of rolling over a target share of EU government bonds 
plus returning interest payments to issuing countries. In this way, the commitment to 
roll over and the reversal of interest payments would correspond to a debt cancellation 
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and the portion of debt involved in the operation could be cancelled from the debt/GDP 
ratios. 
(2) The second is conversion of the bonds held by the ECB into irredeemable zero-interest 
bonds. According to this second strategy, ECB current government bond holdings can 
be considered as the first step of the PADRE plan, and what needs to be done to 
complete the operation is the second step of transforming them into irredeemable bonds 
at zero interest rates. The only difference would be the amount of debt transformed 
(which would be lower than under the more ambitious PADRE plan, which involved 
all debt in excess of the 60% debt/GDP ratio). 
(3) The third hypothesis is an outright write-off of a given portion of public bonds held by 
the ECB, a decision that would have the consequence of creating a net negative asset 
position in the ECB balance sheet. 
(4) A fourth hypothesis is the issue of perpetual bonds from member countries by the 
amount corresponding to the debt created during the pandemic, coupled with a 
commitment by the ECB to buy them on the secondary market and hold them to 
maturity. In this way the newly issued perpetual bonds would become part of the ECB 
quantitative easing program and COVID-19 debt relief would be perfectly compatible 
with EU treaties. 
(5) A fifth hypothesis is the combination of outright cancellation of part of the debt with 
the ECB commitment to a progressive replacement of the stock of government bonds 
over time in its balance sheet. In this sense the ECB decision would produce a double 
positive effect on EU member states government debt service, by reducing twice the 
share of debt to GDP held by non-ECB investors. The double move would eventually 
shift the problem from the asset/liability side to the profit/loss dimension. 
(6) A sixth hypothesis is a commitment progressively to increase the stock of member 
states government bonds, though sticking to a voluntary and revocable policy of rolling 
over the debt and returning interest payments to bond issuers. 
(7) A seventh hypothesis set forth by Micossi (2020) prescribes that the government debt 
held by the ECB be purchased by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) using its 
own capital as collateral and financing the operation with ESM bond issues. 
 
In our paper we analyse the potential effects of each one of these different debt relief 
choices on moral hazard, ECB balance sheet, Central Bank independence and reputation, and 
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its implications for inflation and the exchange rate. We as well conclude that, given the 
commonalities among the main CBs, debt relief could also be the outcome of a coordinated 
choice among them which would reduce the potential negative side effects of the decision of a 
single CB move on its reputation and the exchange rate. 
 
 
2. Effects of the six measures on the ECB balance sheet and their legal consequences 
 
EU GDP amounted to 18.8 trillion in 2019; the EU debt generated by the COVID-19 pandemic 
can be conventionally fixed at 10%. The ECB balance sheet has on the asset side 2.87 trillion 
of EU member long term bonds and 0.6 trillion for REPO and short term monetary policy. The 
2.87 trillion stock of EU member government bonds was progressively created in the last years 
through the quantitative easing. It was almost zero before the year 2000. On the liability side 
the two main items are 1.2 banknotes and 1.8 bank reserves. ECB profits in 2019 rose from to 
2.36 from 1.57 billion euros due to an increase in net interest income and profits from financial 
operations. 
The first scenario (freezing of the current situation with transformation from voluntary 
to perpetual irrevocable commitment to roll over and return the interest payments) would freeze 
the current profits and losses position of the ECB. The same would occur under the second 
hypothesis (conversion of long-term bonds into irredeemable bonds yielding zero interest 
rates), because the ECB does not earn from interest rates on its long-term bond assets. Under 
these first two hypotheses the concerns about ECB balance sheet effects and reputation would 
be minimized. 
The third hypothetical scenario (debt write-off) would create a loss on ECB assets 
compensated by the present value of current and future expected seignorage revenues (as in the 
Pâris and Wyplosz 2014 PADRE proposal). The effects of such a loss on the euro exchange 
rates and on ECB reputation need to be taken into account. The ECB can accompany this 
measure by a change in its seignorage policy by reducing the share of seignorage paid to 
sovereign countries. Sovereign countries would thus partially participate to the cost of the 
intervention and their benefits will be reduced. Alternatively, the ECB could maintain its actual 
seignorage policy thereby not reducing the time needed to cover the loss on its balance sheet. 
It can be argued that this third approach to debt relief could weaken the ECB ability to 
implement anti-inflationary policies. However (as we discuss in detail in sections 4 and 6 
below) given the amount of government bonds on the ECB asset side, and given the wide range 
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of instruments at its disposal to conduct monetary policies, the ECB will maintain intact its 
capacity of counter inflationary pressures. 
The fourth hypothesis is fully compatible with current Treaties. EU member states 
would issue perpetual bonds up to the amount corresponding to the defined target COVID-19 
debt/GDP ratio, and the ECB would voluntarily choose to include them into its Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) strategy. This hypothesis, differently from the 
previous ones, implies a further monetary expansion and therefore its use should be assessed 
with caution. 
The fifth hypothesis combines debt relief with monetary expansion through the 
additional purchase of government bonds. Over time the overall effect on the asset/liability 
side would be nil since the write-off would be progressively offset by the purchase of the new 
bonds. 
The sixth hypothesis is just an incremental variation of the current voluntary and 
revocable policy that would correspond to a monetary expansion but nonetheless would 
correspond to an increase in the ECB commitment to cope with the problem of COVID-19 
government debt. 
The seventh hypothesis consists of transferring sovereign bonds purchased by the ECB 
to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which could roll over these securities thereby 
making them equivalent to irredeemable bonds (Micossi, 2020). The purchase of bonds would 
be funded by securities issued by the ESM. These securities would be guaranteed by the ESM’s 
own capital and by the existing member states. 
The feasibility of the seven proposals should also be evaluated in legal terms. All the 
seven proposals discussed above do not violate art. 1231 in the sense that they do not propose 
the purchase of EU member government bonds on the primary market (even though some 
doubts could be raised for the fourth hypothesis). A related legal issue is whether the proposals 
1 Article 123 (ex Article 101 TEC): 
“1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or 
with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as "national central banks") 
in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local 
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European 
Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the 
supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks 
and the European Central Bank as private credit institutions.” 
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could breach the principle of separation between monetary and fiscal policy, and whether such 
a breach would represent by itself a violation of EU treaties. What we observe is that the PEPP 
is intended to counter the risk of monetary transmission mechanism but is de facto helping 
governments to maintain low interest rates on government bonds. As such, it is thus an explicit 
help to their fiscal policies. It is however a temporary program, while our proposals are meant 
to have permanent effects on the portion of debt held by the ECB.2  
 
 
3. The moral hazard problem 
 
One of the main critiques to a debt relief proposal is that it may foster moral hazard.  A lack of 
fiscal discipline could offset the effects of debt cancellation. Two forms of moral hazard are 
possible: interim and ex post. In the interim, the discussion of the possibility of debt relief 
before the end of the pandemic could lead EU member countries to increase their deficits, in 
the expectation that the additional debt would be cancelled. Ex post, a successful episode of 
debt relief could create expectations of possible debt cancellations in the future, thereby 
undermining the ex ante incentive to maintain fiscal discipline. 
Easterly (2002) forcefully pointed out the risk that debt relief could be used to fund 
unproductive activities or even patronage. Under some circumstances, there could even be an 
incentive for lenders to keep lending to indebted countries, thus creating the conditions for 
further high indebtedness. Benjamin and Wright (2008) and Pitchford and Wright (2012) 
demonstrate that the inability of sovereign borrowers and lenders to commit could lead to 
protracted debt renegotiations and losses to both parties. 
Moral hazard problems, and the potential build-up of further debt, can be solved by 
imposing enforceable and credible conditionality rules. The Next Generation EU is itself an 
example where an increase in EU resources for public investment is accompanied by rules that 
block the supply of subsequent tranches if the intermediate project goals are not achieved. 
Protracted renegotiations can be avoided by timely and unilateral actions by the ECB and by 
 
2 According to ECB, “The Governing Council will terminate net asset purchases under the PEPP once 
it judges that the COVID-19 crisis phase is over, but in any case not before the end of June 2021. The 
maturing principal payments from securities purchased under the PEPP will be reinvested until at least 
the end of 2022. In any case, the future roll-off of the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid 
interference with the appropriate monetary stance”. 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html). 
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EU institutions which would not require lengthy deliberations, and which could be promptly 
communicated and implemented. 
Interim moral hazard can be avoided by careful monitoring of the public finances of the 
member states during the crisis. Ex post moral hazard problems can be ruled out by credibility 
of ECB stance and by the very extraordinary nature of the current pandemic. If COVID-19 debt 
cancellation/relief is declared and accepted as being a unique decision linked to a unique event, 
the expectations of future debt cancellation should be under control. 
It is also important that the measures that are implemented are perceived as decisive, in 
order to rule out the possibility that further future debt relief may become necessary in the 
future. The restructuring or cancellation of debt should therefore be of an order of magnitude 
sufficient to exclude additional interventions. 
Moral hazard issues could be further reduced by a coordinated action by the main 
central banks, including not just the ECB but also possibly the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of Japan. This would lend credibility to the debt relief operation, make it more extraordinary 
thereby reducing the expectation that such an intervention could be repeated in the future. 
The moral hazard is a serious problem, but it can be tackled by proper credible 
announcement and action on conditionality rules. 
 
 
4. Inflation and inflation forecasts: the “porcupine curse” 
 
The main Central Bank default risk depends on finding itself unable to tackle a sudden 
inflationary pressure. From the opposite perspective the power of CBs grows when inflation 
risk gets lower. We argue in this section that structural factors create a deflationary scenario 
which can be exploited by the ECB. In the old pre-globalisation system and before the internet 
era, the pace of innovation was lower and labour unions had strong bargaining power over 
wages since corporations had no outside option of delocalisation. Hence higher money supply 
easily translated into higher prices in non-competitive markets where price setters could 
increase their profits by rising prices and unions had higher probability of success in their wage 
claims. In the current global competition system and after the web revolution the circulation of 
knowledge has incredibly accelerated, and companies can more easily choose the production 
location that minimises their labour, environmental and tax costs in order to maximise their 
profits. 
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The production cost race-to-the-bottom dominates this era, forcing national and 
regional institutions to a Bertrand competition which could eventually lead to an equilibrium 
of “nations without wealth and wealth without nations”. Competition on quality and non-
delocalizable competitive factors can obviously counteract this pressure which however 
remains strong. As a consequence, we now have two relevant factors of deflationary pressure: 
technological innovation which reduces production costs, and the erosion of the bargaining 
power of workers under the delocalisation threat and the pressure of competitors producing in 
other areas of the world were wages are lower. 
The stylised facts of this new era are consequently a stronger pace of innovation, 
increasing skill wage differentials (Dögüs, 2019) and within country inequalities (workers 
bargaining power depend on their skills and not on trade unions and those who are at the bottom 
of the talent ladder suffer more in this competitive race), a declining labour share 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), and deflationary pressures that lead to repeated upward 
biased inflation forecasts (the well-known porcupine effect) if forecasters continue to model 
expectations under the old pre globalisation approach. Ciccarelli and Osbat (2017) show that 
inflation has indeed been systematically below forecasts in the last years, with the bias falling 
when the time distance with inflation release date got closer. 
A further deflationary structural factor contributing to deflationary pressures is 
demographics. Ciccarelli and Osbat (2017) find a positive and significant relationship between 
inflation and the growth of working age population, thereby showing that ageing in EU 
countries can be a key explanatory factor for deflation. 
The pace of technological innovation is even producing more deflationary pressure than 
what we see in official data since, as is well known, inflation indexes do not fully adjust for 
product quality (Nordhaus, 1998). Imagine for a moment an inflation index created on a bundle 
composed of food, services, technology and a significant share of goods that decades ago we 
had to buy (travel agency services, tutorials, photos, cd records, information) and today are 
mostly free on the web. If we compare the level of this aggregated price index at distance we 
realize that inflation has been much lower than what recorded in official statistics due to a 
survivorship bias effect, since the latter do not incorporate -100% inflation rates of goods and 
services which are now been offered for free. In addition to it, programmes installed on our 
cellphones are automatically updated and improved in quality after our purchase. Hence the 
price per quality of the product continues to fall after our purchase. 
In addition to it the recent logistic revolution operated by global players like Amazon 
can procure whatever raw or intermediate product from the other side of the world, thereby 
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reducing production costs. If the first phase of the internet era accelerated the circulation of 
knowledge and weightless data, the application of this revolution to logistics is also 
accelerating the circulation of material goods thereby creating a further factor of deflationary 
pressure through a fall in production costs.  The combination of these factors not only makes 
realized official inflation always inferior to what had been forecast but, as well, quite higher 
than the effective rate of inflation. 
Based on this evidence our final claim is that the new globalisation scenario has a cost 
in terms of low wage and dignity of labour for the low skilled, but also – quite apart from the 
acceleration of the flow of knowledge and technological innovation – a benefit in the form of 
the opportunity of more audacious monetary policies given the lower inflation risk, which 
ought to be exploited to offset that cost. 
Of course the additional money created by expansionary monetary policies has to find 
an allocation if it does not inflate prices of real goods and services. The liquidity earned by 
banks selling bonds to the ECB can be left under the form of reserves in the same ECB, it can 
be lent to firms or households or invested in financial assets. Financial asset inflation (together 
with an increase in money balances and bank reserves) is the most likely outcome whose effects 
need to be taken into account in presence of expansionary monetary policies, especially in 
times, as ours, where regulatory requirements are made more stringent to avoid bank crises. 
We however have two remarks on this point. First, many of our debt relief proposals (if we 
exclude (4)-(6)) are not inflationary. Second, the 2008 global financial crisis proved that the 
ECB is fully equipped to address financial crises that would destroy monetary base and 
increases liquidity risk, since the main solution of these crises consists in the same CB activity 
of money creation coupled with provision of liquidity services. 
 
 
5. Further reflections on ECB accounts 
 
As discussed in section 2, one of the most hotly debated issues when discussing the possibility 
of debt relief from a Central Bank creditor concerns its effects on the CB balance sheet. As is 
well known, the ECB balance sheet has changed dramatically during the last decade due to the 
adoption of conventional monetary policies and notably the quantitative easing launched to 
tackle the Euro government spread crisis. 
A relevant objection to debt relief by the ECB it that it could make ECB net assets 
negative thereby undermining its activity. The issue whether a CB can operate or not with 
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negative net assets has been discussed among others by Pâris and Wyplosz (2014), De Grauwe 
and even dealt with by the ECB itself with a discussion paper (Bunea et al., 2016). In the latter 
it is argued that a central bank cannot default since “central banks are protected from 
insolvency due to their ability to create money and can therefore operate with negative equity“ 
(p. 14). According to Pâris and Wyplosz (2014), the negative equity position – a consequence 
of the application of the PADRE plan – is just a problem of accounting conventions and 
reputation, since the present value of seignorage revenues should compensate such loss. 
Cecchetti and Schoenholtz (1985) calculate for the US the net present value of seignorage 
revenues equal to 30% of GDP. 
The inherited accounting standard of CBs are that circulating currency is registered on 
the liability side. This choice made perfect sense at the time of the gold standard when liquidity 
holdings corresponded to claims toward the CB, while it makes less sense today. A liability is 
such when it implies a costly obligation on behalf of the debtor (restitution of the principal 
and/or interest payments). In our case, however, the holder of currency issued by the ECB is 
not entitled of any claim toward it. A hint that this accounting convention is an inheritance of 
the past is that foreign dollar holdings are still considered a liability on the FED balance sheet. 
This was obviously the case until De Gaulle kept asking for gold in exchange for his dollar 
holdings and forced Richard Nixon and the Fed in 1971 to close the dollar-gold convertibility 
era. Since then, dollars held by foreigners are de facto no more a liability for the FED. 
To sum up, currency is today an irredeemable zero-interest liability and therefore is not 
an effective liability. The only possible way to argue for it would be to assume that there exists 
a one-to-one correspondence between Euro currency holdings in the economy and the amount 
of money that the ECB needs to withdraw when facing inflationary pressures with open market 
operations. In this case a proper stock of bonds to be sold for the occasion should be in ECB 
balance sheet. Hence the amount of currency holdings in the economy should find a 
correspondence in a proportional amount of ECB bonds on the asset side. 
To tackle this point we must consider the evolution of the ECB balance sheet. Before 
2000 there were no long-term EU member government bond holdings on the asset side, while 
today their stock in the ECB balance sheet amounts to almost 3 trillion euros. Before the year 
2000, the ECB used for its open market operations its buffer of short-term stocks which is today 
larger than before 2000. If it is undisputable that the currency circulating in the economy is 
much more than 20 years ago, but it is also true that in presence of global competition it has 
gone to inflate financial asset prices with minimal effects on inflation so that CB’s inflationary 
expectations have been systematically upward biased in the last years. It is therefore reasonable 
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to conclude that, even in presence of a decision of freezing or outright write-off of the portion 
of government debts created during the pandemic, the ECB will still have sufficient 
ammunition to face the challenge of future inflationary pressures. 
The points discussed in this section however matter in case of a strong shock on the 
ECB balance sheet comparable to that of the original PADRE plan. In our seven proposals the 
impact is much more modest and, in some cases, negligible, with the exception of the third 
(debt write-off) hypothesis. 
 
 
6. Effects on ECB independence and “whatever it takes” options 
 
Another important issue is whether COVID-19 debt relief could represent a threat to ECB 
independence. The importance of independence of central banks is now widely accepted as 
being crucial to avoid the time inconsistency issues in the conduct of monetary policy. In his 
seminal contribution, Walsh (1985) discussed the design of incentives which would commit 
central bankers to a rigorous pursuit of policies to control inflation. Central bank independence 
has indeed been shown to be associated with lower inflation in developed countries 
(Cukierman, 1992). 
Debelle and Fischer (1994) introduced an important distinction between “goal 
independence” and “instrument independence” of the central bank. Whilst the former refers to 
the central bank’s ability to set the goals of policy without direct influence of the fiscal 
authority, the latter pertains to its capability to adapt its policy tools to the pursuit of its goals, 
depending on the specific circumstances that it faces (see also Walsh, 2008). The ECB has 
arguably given proof of instrument independence in its response to the financial crisis (Draghi, 
2018). Indeed, it could be maintained that it was its very ability to adopt the most appropriate 
instruments in response to the changed financial and macroeconomic circumstances which 
made it possible for the ECB to fulfil the mandate prescribed by its charter. 
In a scenario of excessively high debt a further extension of the CBs non-conventional 
polices in the direction of a COVID-19 debt relief, far from being a violation of ECB mandate, 
could actually be the most appropriate strategy to pursue its statutory goal of ensuring the 
proper transmission of monetary policy (thereby respecting goal independence) through 
instrument independence enriched by new options that appear convenient and desirable after 
the pandemic shock. 
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Insofar as the choice is an exceptional and voluntary decision by the ECB related to the 
specificity of the COVID-19 pandemic, the fear that its credibility and independence would be 
called into question is likely to be exaggerated. The ECB decision in presence of an 
extraordinary event would not imply that governments can pressurize it to repeat such a 
decision in ordinary times. If we offer advice to a friend or a relative they may take it or not, 
but it would be unusual of them to respond that this is an attempt to violate their independence.  
ECB independence includes the possibility of using “whatever it takes” options in 
presence of negative reactions to its COVID-19 debt relief policies. These are not only limited 
to the creation of money supply (which is always limited by the risk of inflation) but also to 
the possibility of creating new financial instruments or of changing the monetary rules of the 
system, in the face of changed circumstances outside its control. Indeed, it is this very flexibility 
in adapting its instruments to changed conditions which confers credibility to the Central Bank 
and which validates its reputation. 
 
 
7. Distributive concerns 
 
Distributive concerns seemed to be an insurmountable barrier to developments of EU fiscal 
and monetary policy some years ago. The Pâris and Wyplosz’s PADRE plan was accurately 
carved in order to avoid distributional problems across EU member states. The characteristics 
of the Next Generation EU where the share of contributions are proportional to the COVID-19 
impact on the economies of EU member states and not to their ECB’s capital shares have shown 
that this taboo has been overcome. 
This does not mean that distributional issues do not require to be dealt with care. A debt 
relief operation is much easier to manage for central banks of single or federal states than for a 
central bank running monetary policy for several independent EU member states, each of them 
having their own fiscal policies with high degree of autonomy. 
A related issue is the relationship between Eurozone and non Eurozone EU member 
states, since the ECB only holds government bonds of the first group. A possible solution here 
would be the purchase of a proportional amount of government bonds of non-Eurozone EU 
members and their subsequent freezing, rescheduling or cancellation or, alternatively, the ECB 
support to similar plans implemented by independent CBs of non-Eurozone EU member states. 




8 A stress test of the effect of COVID-19 debt relief on ECB 
 
As is well known Central Banks are powerful but not almighty since they face an exchange 
rate risk, an interest rate risk, and a “default” risk related to the failure of achieving their goal 
of preserving the real value of money in presence of hyperinflation. 
In this section we examine the potential implications of COVID-19 debt relief in terms 
of a stress test focusing on its impact on the above three forms of risk. 
Most of exchange risk is run by central banks when they try to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate or a peg. This is not the case of the ECB. The likely impact of COVID-19 debt 
relief is likely to be negligible (especially if we exclude case three), at most leading to moderate 
currency depreciation with effects on real economy depending on pass through and Marshall-
Lerner conditions. 
Interest rate risk is related to both sides of the ECB balance sheet. Changes in profits 
and losses should at least partially match when interest rates change since interest payments 
are profits on the bond side and outflows on the liability side where the ECB remunerates bank 
reserves. As it happens, the extremely expansionary monetary policy in times of the COVID-
19 pandemic leads the ECB to gain from both sides of the balance sheet because of a reduction 
in losses due to the negative interest rates on bank reserves, and an increase in total profits also 
arising from net interest payments. 
The most likely risk that we should therefore consider in our “stress test” is a sudden 
need to counteract inflationary pressures to avoid “default” risk and hyperinflation. In section 
4 we explain why we believe that this risk is not severe. Another argument to consider is that 
the COVID-19 debt relief reduces from this point of view ammunitions of the ECB in terms of 
open market operations. The amount of long-term government bonds remaining after COVID-
19 debt cancellation would however remain large enough for this policy instrument to be 
effective. One should also not forget that CBs have plenty of instruments to perform their main 
goal including changes in policy rates, interest rates on excess reserves, and volume reserve 
requirements including bank regulatory policies that crucially affect their lending policies and 
therefore the creation of high powered money. Before the implementation of quantitative 
easing, anti-inflationary policies were effectively pursued with a much smaller stock of bonds 
and almost entirely with short-term government bonds (hence without the 2.87 trillion stock of 
long-term government bonds that will be in part interested by the debt relief proposals). In the 
extremely unlikely event of a very strong inflationary pressure, the ECB could even decide to 
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issue their own bonds to reduce market liquidity. If it is true that the amount liquidity 
circulating is much larger today than in the pre-quantitative easing period, but the existing 
instruments are more than sufficient to perform anti-inflationary policies. 
To sum up, the most serious risk in CB action is inflation. We however explained in the 
paper that COVID-19 debt relief does not increase this risk for three reasons: i) several of the 
proposed forms of debt relief discussed in the paper are inflation neutral (see Table 1); ii) 
inflation has been systematically overestimated by institutional and private forecasts and is 
overestimated in inflation indexes currently in use (see section 4); iii) the COVID-19 debt relief 
proposals do not significantly reduce the range of CB’s anti-inflationary tools that could be 





The unexpected world shock of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a significant growth of 
debt/GDP ratios in most countries. Such increase in debt is largely due to factors outside of the 
responsibility of the governments and is justified by the need to alleviate the effects of the 
pandemic on firms and households. The economic literature shows that episodes of debt relief 
in the 20th century have not been uncommon, were not limited to developing countries, and 
proved quite successful in terms of their effects on debtors’ post-intervention economic and 
financial recovery. The debt relief hypotheses discussed in this paper are however different 
from these historical episodes, since our hypotheses are strictly limited to the debt held by a 
creditor that is not a sovereign state but a central bank which holds bonds of sovereign states 
and operates their monetary policy. 
We outline seven ways in which softer or stronger ways of COVID-19 debt relief could 
be implemented and evaluate their effects on ECB balance sheet, reputation and independence, 
on debtors’ moral hazard and on inflation and exchange rate. 
Our conclusions are that COVID-19 debt relief measures are technically feasible with 
limited side effects and without harming the ECB power of adopting anti-inflationary policies. 
In the recent debate on the fiscal paradigm shift Furman and Summers (2020) argue that what 
really matters in debt sustainability is not the usual stock/flow debt/GDP ratio but the flow/flow 
ratio between real interest payment and the GDP. Empirical evidence shows that, in spite of 
the large growth of the first ratio, the active policies pursued by CBs (quantitative easing plus 
restitution of interest payments) have dramatically reduced the second ratio. In the case of Italy 
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the year 2000 saw a 105.1 debt/GDP ratio and 6.3% interest payment/GDP ratio, compared 
with expected 159% debt/GDP ratio and 3.4 interest payment/GDP ratio in 2020. The 
conclusion is that the debt problem seems to be much less dramatic if we use a flow/flow 
instead of a stock/flow approach. This is however in large part due to the discretionary active 
role of central banks that, on the one side bought around 63% of the new debt created after the 
pandemic and, on the other side, allows government issuers to cash back interest payment. The 
much better flow/flow picture however, if not combined with the stock/flow data hides an 
interest rate upside risk that needs to be managed and would remain high in presence of high 
debt/GDP ratios and non-irrevocable ECB commitment to the actual policy. 
Writing well before the onset of the pandemic, Blanchard and Summers (2017) 
forcefully argued that a critical lesson from the Great Financial Crisis is the need for more 
aggressive and ambitious fiscal policies. More recently, Paul Krugman (2020) joined the call 
for a paradigm shift in fiscal policy. Our analysis on the seven debt relief proposals aims to 
achieve a permanent and non-temporary improvement of the debt/GDP ratio in order to 
increase debt sustainability and free resources for investment and economic prosperity. The 
considerations developed in our position paper on effects on inflation, exchange rate, ECB 
independence, ECB balance sheet and different sources of ECB risk suggest that there is 
enough room to do so. More to it, in presence of an increased debt burden on Eurozone 
members ECB debt relief intervention can even be an optimal strategy increasing its instrument 
independence to mitigate sovereign debt risk in the euro area, pursue its statutory goal and 
ensuring correct transmission of monetary policies The room of manoeuvre would even be 
much larger if we imagine that the main world CBs realise the fiscal paradigm shift and 
understand that it is convenient to act cooperatively such change and the conditions for a 
cooperative equilibrium seem to exist if debt relief would produce just small effects on inflation 
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